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WHEN THE SANITY CODE BECOMES THE
INSANITY CODE: FOLLOWING O’BANNON’S
LEAD IS THE KEY TO SOLVING GROUP
LICENSING FOR NCAA STUDENT-ATHLETES
Lee VanHorn*
“Many times when you lose, it’s the greatest opportunity to
improve. You have this unique opportunity to make dramatic
change that you probably couldn’t make when things seem to be
going right.”1
A YouTube channel titled “Deestroying” displays unique
talents of a Costa Rican immigrant named Donald De La Haye
(“De La Haye”).2 De La Haye has a second channel, “KD
Family,” and together, the channels have a combined 486 million
views and more than three million subscribers.3 De La Haye
majored in marketing at the University of Central Florida
(“UCF”), but creates content for his YouTube channels as his fulltime job.”4 While this may sound like a typical American success
story of someone who immigrated to the United States, realized
*
J.D., University of Arkansas School of Law, 2020. This author sincerely thanks
Professor Clay Sapp, University of Arkansas School of Law, for his guidance and wisdom
during the writing process. The author would also like to thank the editors of the Arkansas
Law Review for their attention to detail and precision while editing and Nick Bell, Editorin-Chief of the Arkansas Law Review, for his flexibility and support during the publication
process.
1. Coach K Backs NCAA Changes, ESPN (Oct. 3, 2013), [https://perma.cc/F7K8NWSZ].
2. Robert Henneke & Jon Riches, Attorneys: UCF’s De La Haye Settles for a Bright
Future off the Field, ORLANDO SENTINEL (Nov. 16, 2018), [https://perma.cc/QD7AZVUK].
3. See Deestroying, YOUTUBE, [https://perma.cc/6N43-35WL] (last visited Feb. 5,
2021); KD Family, YOUTUBE, [https://perma.cc/6TS5-Q785] (last visited Feb. 5, 2021).
4. Associated Press, Ex-UCF Kicker Says There Was No Compromise as He Defends
Choice to Give up Eligibility, ESPN (Aug. 1, 2017), [https://perma.cc/W4JW-7A7Q]; James
Hale, YouTube Millionaires: NFL Hopeful Donald De La Haye Was Forced to Choose
Between YouTube and Football — but Now He Aims for Both, TUBEFILTER (Jan. 31, 2019),
[https://perma.cc/FH26-BK5S].
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his dream, and capitalized on an opportunity, there’s only one
glitch—the National Collegiate Athletic Association (“NCAA”).
One of De La Haye’s unique talents displayed in his
YouTube videos is kicking a football.5 He was a member of
UCF’s football team in 2015 and 2016.6 De La Haye’s videos
showed off his unique skillset, but most videos did not mention
UCF or the NCAA.7 Instead, De La Haye used his YouTube
channel to further his academic and professional career in
marketing.8 In 2017, UCF’s Compliance Office delivered an
ultimatum: demonetize your YouTube channel or be banned from
NCAA competition.9 Because De La Haye was an amateur
student-athlete at UCF, he was not allowed to earn
compensation.10 De La Haye chose YouTube.11
But student-athletes are seemingly the only people not
allowed to profit from their talent. While at UCF, De La Haye
played under Head Coach Scott Frost, who signed a five-year,
$8.5 million contract prior to the 2016 season.12 If the school
terminated Frost before his contract expired, he would still
receive $850,000 for each year remaining on the agreement.13
However, Frost parlayed UCF’s success into a seven-year, $35
million contract with the University of Nebraska following the
2017 season.14
During that same timeframe, schools and conferences across
the country signed exorbitant contracts with apparel suppliers and
multimedia rights holders. While UCF does not release the

5. See Steven Ruiz, A College Football Player Has a Hit YouTube Channel. He Might
Have to Give It up To Remain Eligible., USA TODAY SPORTS: FOR THE WIN (June 12, 2017),
[https://perma.cc/X79P-KAZC].
6. 2016 Football Roster, UCF, [https://perma.cc/J22Q-URK3] (last visited Feb. 5,
2020).
7. Steven Ruiz, supra note 5.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. See NCAA, DIVISION I MANUAL § 12 (2020) [hereinafter MANUAL].
11. Associated Press, supra note 4.
12. Jeff Sharon, Here Are Scott Frost’s Contract Terms at UCF, BLACK & GOLD
BANNERET (Dec. 3, 2015), [https://perma.cc/H5XT-9FW3].
13. Id.
14. Rebecca S. Gratz, Scott Frost’s Contract with Nebraska Makes Him Highest-Paid
Coach in School History, OMAHA WORLD HERALD (Dec. 2, 2017), [https://perma.cc/TM48FWR7].
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details of its apparel agreement with Nike,15 the American
Athletic Conference16 (the “AAC”) leads all Group of Five
conferences17 with an average apparel deal of nearly $2.8 million
per year per school.18 Meanwhile, the Power Five conferences19
boast an average apparel contract worth almost $4.5 million per
year20 with at least three universities that secured apparel deals
worth more than a quarter of a billion dollars.21 On top of their
apparel agreements, schools also receive a share of their
respective conferences’ multi-media rights deals.22 The AAC’s
latest media rights deal is worth $1 billion over twelve years with
ESPN.23 Under that agreement, each of the AAC’s member
schools will receive nearly $7 million annually.24 Power Five
schools are also enjoying the fruits of outrageous media rights
deals.25 In 2018, the Big Ten Conference distributed $54 million
to its member schools.26 Other distributions included $43.7
million to each Southeastern Conference school, $34.7 million to
each Big 12 school, and $29.5 million to each Pac-12 and Atlantic
Coast Conference school.27
15. Iliana Limón Romero, UCF Inks Two-Year Extension, Expanded Deal with Nike,
ORLANDO SENTINEL, (April 26, 2016), [https://perma.cc/U29H-BHTN].
16. UCF is one of twelve teams that make up the AAC. About, AMERICAN ATHLETIC
CONF., [https://perma.cc/W5AN-258F] (last visited Jan. 23, 2021).
17. Group of Five Conferences include the AAC, Mountain West Conference,
Conference USA, Mid-American Conference, and Sun Belt Conference. Dennis Dodd,
Majority of Power Five Schools Favor Breaking Away to Form Own Division within NCAA,
Survey Shows, CBS (Oct. 13, 2020), [https://perma.cc/NK8W-NCW9].
18. JONATHAN A. JENSEN & TYLER WISNIEWSKI, CTR. FOR RESEARCH IN
INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS, INTERCOLLEGIATE APPAREL AGREEMENT REPORT 3
(2017), [https://perma.cc/3EZA-NN5X].
19. Power Five Conferences include the Big 12 Conference, Pac-12 Conference, Big
Ten Conference, Southeastern Conference, and Atlantic Coast Conference. Dodd, supra
note 17.
20. JENSEN & WISNIEWSKI, supra note 18, at 3.
21. Breaking Down College Shoe and Apparel Deals, ESPN, (Sept. 27, 2017)
[https://perma.cc/Y9Y6-8XXR].
22. See David Ching, Big Ten’s Rights Deal Threatens to Widen Financial Gap
Between Even the Biggest Conferences, FORBES, (April 27, 2018), [https://perma.cc/U637FX5W].
23. Michael Smith & John Ourand, AAC, ESPN Agree To 12-Year Media-Rights Deal
Worth $1B, SBJ DAILY (Mar. 19, 2019), [https://perma.cc/XLL7-BLLZ].
24. Id.
25. Steve Berkowtiz (@ByBerkowitz), TWITTER (May 24, 2019, 1:12 PM),
[https://perma.cc/64X2-9MKB].
26. Id.
27. Id.
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On October 29, 2019, the NCAA’s Board of Governors
decided enough is enough and finally directed its three Divisions
to begin the process of “modernizing”28 its bylaws to enhance
name, image, and likeness opportunities for student-athletes.29
The NCAA planned to implement new rules that allow studentathletes to benefit from their names, images, and likenesses “in a
manner consistent with the collegiate model” by January 2021,
but the NCAA failed to meet that deadline.30 The Board of
Governors outlined eight requirements for the new rules: (1)
“[a]ssure student-athletes are treated similarly to non-athlete
students unless a compelling reason exists to differentiate;” (2)
“[m]aintain the priorities of education and the collegiate
experience to provide opportunities for student-athlete success;”
(3) “[e]nsure rules are transparent, focused and enforceable and
facilitate fair and balanced competition;” (4) “[m]ake clear
the distinction between collegiate and professional opportunities;
(5) “[m]ake clear that compensation for athletics performance or
participation is impermissible;” (6) “[r]eaffirm that studentathletes are students first and not employees of the university;”
(7) “[e]nhance principles of diversity, inclusion and gender
equity;” and (8) “[p]rotect the recruiting environment and prohibit
inducements to select, remain at, or transfer to a specific
institution.”31
The NCAA reluctantly approved legislation that allowed
student-athletes to use their names, images, and likenesses on an
individual level.32 However, it fell short of allowing studentathletes to engage in group licensing deals similar to the
exorbitant deals that have made NCAA institutions exorbitantly
wealthy.33
28. Board of Governors Starts Process to Enhance Name, Image and Likeness
Opportunities, NCAA (Oct. 29, 2019), [https://perma.cc/JF35-RHYR] [hereinafter NCAA].
29. Id.
30. Id.; Michelle Brutlag Hosick, Division I Council Tables Proposals on Name,
Image, Likeness, and Transfers, NCAA (Jan. 11, 2021), [https://perma.cc/6TJM-Q2Q5]; see
also infra Section III.
31. NCAA, supra note 28.
32. See infra Section III.
33. See generally Kristi Dosh, Comparing Apparel and Licensing Contracts in College
Sports, BUS. OF COLL. SPORTS (July 9, 2015), [https://perma.cc/5SDD-8FQG]; CLC Names
Top Selling Universities, LICENSE GLOBAL (Apr. 6, 2018), [https://perma.cc/VZ3U-D8EG].
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This Comment will first trace the origins of amateurism and
its ever-evolving definition by the International Olympic
Committee (“IOC”) in Part I. Part II will discuss the evolution of
amateurism in the NCAA, the NCAA’s previous amateurism
framework, and recent challenges to the NCAA’s amateurism
model. In Part III, this Comment will outline the NCAA’s
response to pressure surrounding name, image, and likeness.
Finally, in Part IV, this Comment will provide an avenue for the
NCAA to adapt its current framework to allow student-athletes to
monetize their names, images, and likenesses for group licensing
deals, while preserving the NCAA’s goal of prioritizing education
and preventing the commercial exploitation of student-athletes.
I. THE HISTORY OF AMATEURISM
The only constant with the definition of “amateur”
throughout history is that it is constantly changing. Although
some trace the origins of amateurism to ancient Greece,
amateurism first rose to prominence in Great Britain during the
late nineteenth century, loosely based on the notion that one
should “do[] things for the love of them, do[] them without reward
or material gain or do[] them unprofessionally.”34 As the
popularity of sports grew so did the amount of spectators, and by
the late 1800s the commercialization of sports began.35 Until
then, the definition of an “amateur” remained an amorphous
concept loosely centered around athletes participating in sports
for the sake of competition.36 As Great Britain’s conquests
around the world expanded, so did the concept and definition of
amateurism—to Cape Town, Sydney, Toronto, and other British
outposts in sub-Sharan Africa, the Caribbean, and Southeast
Asia.37
The first significant attempt to formally define amateurism
came with the resurgence of the Olympic Games (the “Games”).38
34. MATTHEW P. LLEWELLYN & JOHN GLEAVES, THE RISE AND FALL OF OLYMPIC
AMATEURISM 12 (Randy Roberts & Aram Goudsouzian eds., 2016).
35. Id. at 13-14.
36. Id. at 13-16.
37. Id. at 19.
38. Id. at 29.
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In 1894, the International Athletic Congress (the “Congress”)
convened in Paris for what many attendees believed to establish
a definition of amateur.39 However, because amateurism had
been defined so differently across the globe based on sociocultural notions, the Congress struggled to come to a consensus.40
After four days of debate, the Congress finally settled on a
definition of an amateur:
Any individual who has never participated in a competition
open to all comers, nor competed for a cash prize, or for a
prize of any amount of money regardless of its source,
specifically from admissions to the field—or with
professionals—and who has never been, at any time in his
life, a teacher or paid instructor in physical education.41

The Congress allowed many exceptions to this definition and
conceded that it could not apply to all sports.42 The IOC
introduced its first amateur code in 1896, but the code began
eroding almost as soon as it was implemented.43 Because the IOC
lacked jurisdiction in some cases and local officials influenced
other decisions, the definition of amateur remained as amorphous
as before.44 The first three Olympic Games after its revival were
marred with lack of popularity and a governing body unable to
apply its own rules—to the point that professional cyclists openly
competed in the 1900 Paris Games and 1904 St. Louis Games.45
In 1905, the IOC “revived a resolution passed . . . eleven
years earlier that prohibited Olympic amateurs from competing
with or against known professionals, competing for prize money,
or serving as teachers or professors in their chosen specialty.”46
This definition of amateurism held true through the next halfcentury.47 Although the early version of the modern Olympics
were not overly popular, the post-World War II era increased a
39. LLEWELLYN & GLEAVES, supra note 34, at 26.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 27.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 27-29.
44. See LLEWELLYN & GLEAVES, supra note 34, at 29.
45. Id. at 30.
46. Id. at 34.
47. Ross Andrews, Push to Allow Professional Athletes Took Hold in 1968 Olympic
Games, GLOBAL SPORT MATTERS (Oct. 15, 2018), [https://perma.cc/3YJ4-5JLX].
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sense of nationalism and pride in representing one’s country for
athletes and spectators.48 Because of its renewed popularity, the
1968 Games in Mexico City proved to be a turning point for the
IOC.49
The Mexico City Games were the first to be broadcasted
worldwide in color with state-of-the-art technology and
As the world watched, a clash between
commentary.50
amateurism and commercialization brewed.51
Numerous
countries behind the Iron Curtain treated their Olympic athletes
as professionals, which eventually forced the IOC’s hand.52 By
1984, some professional hockey players were allowed to compete
in the Olympics.53 Soon thereafter, the IOC relinquished control
of defining amateurism, and bestowed the power to the
international federation for each sport.54 Today, only one of the
Olympics’ thirty-three sports still prevents professionals from
competing.55
When the IOC allowed professional athletes to compete in
the Olympics, it provided great entertainment from the 1992
Dream Team, but the shift still lacked enough bite to cover all
compensation for athletes—like endorsement deals.56 Rule 40
and Rule 50 of the Olympic Charter govern athletes’ use of their
names, images, and likenesses during competition.57 Bylaw 40.3
exempts compensation for the use of an athlete’s “person, name,
picture or sports performances” for advertising purposes by the
IOC in connection with the Olympics.58 While athletes are
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. See id.
52. Andrews, supra note 47.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Victor Mather, Olympics Is Opening Its Rings to Professional Boxers, N.Y. TIMES
(Mar. 1, 2016), [https://perma.cc/W6S9-KYZR] (explaining that the Olympics began
accepting professional boxers in 2016); Sports, OLYMPICS, [https://perma.cc/3D55-XAZD];
Raisa Bruner, Everything You Need to Know About the 2020 Summer Olympics, TIME (Mar.
24, 2020), [https://perma.cc/NQ4Z-6L72]; Can Professional Athletes Compete in the
Olympics?, RULES OF SPORT.COM, [https://perma.cc/2TL5-AZMP].
56. Andrews, supra note 47.
57. INT’L OLYMPIC COMM., OLYMPIC CHARTER §§ 40, 50 (2020),
[https://perma.cc/S4VT-3RPR] [hereinafter OLYMPIC CHARTER].
58. Id. at § 40.3.
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generally free to pursue endorsements deals outside of the
Olympic competition period, provided that they do not use the
Olympic rings or other Olympics trademarks, Rule 50 generally
governs an athlete’s endorsements during the Olympics.59
Athletes are typically prohibited from endorsing or advertising
products during competition or Olympic ceremonies.60 General
exceptions are included for logos on athletic equipment and
apparel.61 However, guidance handed down by the IOC prior to
the 2020 Tokyo Games indicates that athletes will now be able to
thank personal sponsors during the Games.62 The guidance also
provides that personal sponsors will be able to publish
“congratulatory messages” and engage in “generic advertising
during the Games.”63
II. AMATEURISM AND THE NCAA
While the IOC adapted its definition of amateurism and
allowed mechanisms for its athletes to earn compensation, the
NCAA remained steadfast and has only changed with legal and
political pressures. The one constant with the NCAA’s definition
of an “amateur” is that it has constantly changed since the
organization’s beginning in 1906.64 At its inception, the NCAA
did not allow a college athlete to receive any renumeration for
playing a sport, including a prohibition on financial aid.65 Some
forty years later in 1948, the NCAA introduced a new set of rules
inaptly named the “Sanity Code.”66 The Sanity Code introduced
the notion that collegiate athletes may only receive financial aid
available to the general student body, including tuition and fees,

59. Id. at § 50.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Ed Dixon, US Olympians Able to Promote Personal Sponsors as Rule 40 Is
Relaxed, SPORTSPRO (Oct. 9, 2019), [https://perma.cc/ZW4A-Z4C4].
63. Id.
64. See generally Kristin R. Muenzen, Weakening Its Own Defense? The NCAA’s
Version of Amateurism, 13 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 257 (2003).
65. Id. at 260.
66. David F. Gaona, The National Collegiate Athletic Association: Fundamental
Fairness and the Enforcement Program, 23 ARIZ. L. REV. 1065, 1070 (1981).
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but not room and board.67 In order to receive any financial aid,
the student-athlete must have demonstrated a financial need.68
“In 1951, Walter Byers was named the first-ever executive
director of the NCAA.”69 Although his thirty-six-year tenure as
head of the organization began with the coining of the term
“student-athlete” to emphasize the importance of “student”
among amateur athletes, Byers would quickly become one of the
NCAA’s biggest critics, calling the organization a “nationwide
money-laundering scheme.”70 Before Byers was forced out as
head of the NCAA, the organization once again changed its rule
to allow the now “student-athletes” to receive financial aid for
their room, board, and laundry money.71
Changes to the NCAA’s amateurism definition then fell
dormant until 2014 when it was forced to reconsider its rules after
a former UCLA student-athlete, Ed O’Bannon, sued the NCAA
and Electronic Arts Sports for using his name, image, and likeness
in video games.72 Soon thereafter, Shawne Alston, a former West
Virginia University running back, filed a class action lawsuit on
behalf of current and former football players in five of the top
athletic conferences in the NCAA (the Big 12, Big Ten, Pac-12,
ACC, and SEC).73 Martin Jenkins, a former defensive back for
Clemson University, and two other athletes also filed a class
action stating that financial aid awards and potential
compensation should be determined by an open market and not
regulated by the NCAA.74 These cases were consolidated in In re

67. Wes Gerrie, More Than Just the Game: How Colleges and the NCAA Are Violating
Their Student-Athletes’ Rights of Publicity, 18 TEX. REV. ENT. & SPORTS L. 111, 115 (2018);
Arash Afshar, Collegiate Athletes: The Conflict Between NCAA Amateurism and a Student
Athlete’s Right of Publicity, 51 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 101, 109 (2014).
68. Afshar, supra note 67, at 109.
69. Id. at 121.
70. WALTER BYERS & CHARLES HAMMER, UNSPORTSMANLIKE CONDUCT:
EXPLOITING COLLEGE ATHLETES 69, 73, 369 (1995).
71. Afshar, supra note 67, at 109.
72. Joe Nocera, What Tournament? N.C.A.A.’s Biggest Event May Be at a Higher
Court, N.Y. TIMES (March 22, 2016), [https://perma.cc/2P63-NRBH].
73. See Complaint at 5, 11, 110, Alston v. NCAA, No. 3:14-cv-01011 (N.D. Cal.
dismissed Aug. 19, 2018).
74. See Complaint and Jury Demand – Class Action Seeking Injunction and Individual
Damages at 5, 6, 35, 40, Jenkins v. NCAA, No. 4:14-cv-02758 (D.N.J. filed Mar. 17, 2014)
[hereinafter Jenkins Complaint].
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NCAA Grant-in-Aid Cap Antitrust Litigation.75 Then, in late
2019, a flurry of states began legislative efforts to bar the NCAA
from prohibiting its student-athletes from monetizing their
names, images, and likenesses.76
A. NCAA Framework Prior to Name, Image, and Likeness
Changes
The NCAA governs more than 1,200 institutions across
three divisions: Division I Division II, and Division III.77
Division I is often considered the “highest level of competition”
and is the only division that allows for full scholarships, including
cost-of-attendance stipends.78 While the college sports industry
recently topped $16 billion in revenue, the NCAA limited its
Division I student-athletes to only grant-in-aid scholarships that
cover “tuition and fees, room and board, books and other
expenses related to attendance.”79 Any financial aid or
compensation from the school or a third-party may risk the
student-athlete’s amateur status under those NCAA rules.80
Student-athletes shall be amateurs in an intercollegiate sport,
and their participation should be motivated primarily by
education and by the physical, mental and social benefits to
be derived. Student participation in intercollegiate athletics
is an avocation, and student-athletes should be protected

75. Consolidated Amended Complaint at 1, In re NCAA Athletic Grant-in-Aid Cap
Antitrust Lit., No. 4:14-md-02541-CW (N.D. Cal. July 11, 2014).
76. H.B. 251, 2020 Leg. (Fl. 2020); H.B. 3904, 101st Gen. Assemb. (Il. 2020); S.B.
6722, Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2019).
77. Membership, NCAA, [https://perma.cc/YEM5-23XH] (last visited Jan. 23, 2021).
But see The Difference in the College Division Levels, NCSA, [https://perma.cc/H9T2XZ7V] (last visited Jan. 23, 2021) (stating that there are only 1,102 total member schools
across all the NCAA divisions).
78. MATTHEW J. MITTEN ET AL., SPORTS LAW AND REGULATION 103 (5th ed. 2019);
Division II Partial-Scholarship Model, NCAA, [https://perma.cc/3B8R-75JH] (last visited
Jan. 23, 2021).
79. Paul M. Barrett, In Fake Classes Scandal, UNC Fails Its Athletes—and WhistleBlower, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Feb. 27, 2014) [https://perma.cc/JV7J-ANDK];
MANUAL, supra note 10, at §15.2.6.
80. See generally MANUAL, supra note 10, at § 12.
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Prior to recent name, image, and likeness legislation, Bylaw
12 in the NCAA framework for Division I institutions governed
amateurism and agents.82 The NCAA dictated that a studentathlete forfeited eligibility if he or she “[u]se[d] his or her athletics
skill (directly or indirectly) for pay in any form in that sport,” or
“[e]nter[ed] into an agreement with an agent.”83 Bylaw 12 also
denied student-athletes the right to use “his or her name or picture
to advertise, recommend or promote directly the sale or use of a
commercial product or service of any kind” or to receive
compensation for endorsing a product through that studentathlete’s use of a product or service.84 Bylaw 12 also prohibited
a student-athlete from hiring an agent “for the purpose of
marketing his or her athletics ability or reputation in that sport.”85
B. Recent Challenges
Since 2014, the NCAA has faced constant pressure from lawsuits
and legislation to adapt its prohibition on compensation for
student-athletes.86 With those challenges, the NCAA has taken
incremental steps to merely satisfy court judgments while

maintaining its view of amateurism.87

i. NCAA v. O’Bannon and the Trust Account Model
A common refrain from detractors of compensating athletes
is that compensation threatens the spirit of amateurism and the

81. This statement is the NCAA’s explanation of its “Principle of Amateurism.” Id. at
§ 2.9.
82. Id. at § 12.
83. Id. at § 12.1.2.
84. Id. at § 12.5.2.1.
85. MANUAL, supra note 79, at § 12.3.1.
86. See generally O’Bannon v. NCAA, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955, 972 (N.D. Cal. 2014);
Consolidated Amended Complaint, supra note 75, at 71-72, 85; H.B. 251, 2020 Leg. (Fl.
2020); H.B. 3904, 101st Gen. Assemb. (Ill. 2020); S.B. 6722, Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2019).
87. See generally O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 972; Consolidated Amended Complaint,
supra note 75, at 6.
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role of student-athletes.88 The most common solution to preserve
amateurism comes from Judge Claudia Wilken’s opinion in
O’Bannon: trust accounts.89 Before being overturned by the
Ninth Circuit, Judge Wilken granted an injunction that allowed
schools and conferences to establish a trust account for athletes,
payable upon graduation or expiration of eligibility, in which the
school would deposit a share of licensing revenue earned by the
school.90 The NCAA could set a cap on the amount of money
held in trust for each athlete, but the cap could be no less than
$5,000 for every year that the student-athlete maintained
academic eligibility.91
O’Bannon marked a noticeable change in courts’ treatment
of antitrust claims against the NCAA, as the amateurism
justification typically defeated any challenges to the NCAA’s
trade restrictions.92 When the District Court for the Northern
District of California rebuked this justification, it applied the rule
of reason test articulated by the Supreme Court in Board of
Regents v. Univ. of Oklahoma, which required (1) the plaintiff’s
showing that the restraint produces substantial “adverse, anticompetitive effects within the relevant product and geographic
markets;” (2) the defendant’s demonstration that the restraint
promotes “a sufficiently pro-competitive objective;” and (3) the
plaintiff’s proof “that the restraint is not reasonably necessary to
achieve the stated objective.”93 Judge Wilken determined that the
NCAA’s restraint on compensation violated antitrust law because
it did not reasonably support a competitive purpose.94 The court
noted that in a “college education market,” NCAA compensation
88. Patrick Hruby, The NCAA Says Paying Athletes Hurts Their Education. That’s
Laughable., WASH. POST (Sept. 20, 2018), [https://perma.cc/XV7S-XGXU].
89. See O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 982.
90. Id. at 1008.
91. Id.
92. Brian Welch, Comment, Unconscionable Amateurism: How the NCAA Violates
Antitrust by Forcing Athletes to Sign Away Their Image Rights, 44 J. MARSHALL L. REV.
533, 539-41 (2011).
93. NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 103 (1984); see also
Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056, 1065 (11th Cir. 2005).
94. O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 985 (citing American Needle, Inc. v. Nat’l Football
League, 560 U.S. 183, 203 (2010)) (stating that “[t]he Supreme Court . . . specifically held
that concerted actions undertaken by joint ventures should be analyzed under the rule of
reason”).
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regulations have a significant anticompetitive effect because they
fix the price that schools pay to secure college athletes’ services.95
Next, the court individually addressed each of the NCAA’s
justifications for its restriction on compensation of studentathletes,96 and acknowledged that the NCAA’s rules serve two
pro-competitive purposes—the promotion of amateurism and the
integration of academics with athletics—because both increase
consumer demand for college sports.97 In the third step of the
analysis, the court considered whether there were any
“substantially less restrictive” alternatives to the NCAA’s current
rules.98
The court issued an injunction against the NCAA requiring
that it permit schools to offer student-athletes scholarships equal
to the full cost of attendance.99 Additionally, the District Court
adopted one of O’Bannon’s suggested alternatives, which would
permit schools to hold payments in trust for student-athletes.100
The court held that member schools could set aside $5,000 per
year in deferred compensation that would be distributed after a
student-athlete’s graduation.101 This was the first time a federal
court found that the NCAA’s amateurism regulations violated
antitrust laws, let alone issued an injunction requiring changes to
the bylaws.102
The District Court suggested that holding a limited amount
of money in a trust until after the student-athletes leave school
would compensate them for the use of their names, images, and
likenesses while still “integrating academics and athletics.”103
According to Judge Wilken, the NCAA failed to provide enough
evidence that paying players would affect the competitive
balance.104 Most importantly, the District Court noted that while
amateurism could justify limited restrictions on student-athlete
95. Id. at 972-73.
96. Id. at 999-1004.
97. Id. at 973.
98. Id. at 1005.
99. O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 1007-08.
100. Id. at 1008.
101. Id.
102. O’Bannon v. NCAA, 802 F.3d 1049, 1053 (9th Cir. 2015).
103. O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 1008.
104. Id. at 1002.
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compensation, it could not justify the particular restrictions on
receiving compensation for the use of the student-athlete’s name,
image, and likeness.105 The District Court also found that
O’Bannon presented “ample evidence . . . to show that the college
sports industry has changed substantially in the thirty years since
Board of Regents was decided.”106 Therefore, the values served
by upholding amateurism “do not justify the rigid prohibition on
compensating . . . [for] the use of [players’] names, images, and
likenesses.”107 The District Court determined that the NCAA’s
blanket restraints on compensation violated antitrust law and held
that less restrictive alternatives were available.108 The court
issued an injunction requiring the NCAA to alter its bylaws to (1)
permit its member institutions to issue scholarships up to full cost
of attendance and (2) allow its members to hold a maximum of
$5,000 annually in a trust for each student-athlete.109
Even though the Ninth Circuit ultimately reversed the
District Court and upheld the NCAA’s prohibition against schools
and conferences establishing trust accounts for its players,110
former University of North Carolina basketball coach Dean Smith
created a trust that paid $200 to every letterman that played for
him.111 The NCAA ruled that the disbursements from the trust
account did not violate NCAA pay-for-play rules without any
explanation as to why this particular compensation was
allowed.112 How far the NCAA will stretch its approval of similar
trust accounts remains to be seen.

105. Id. at 1001.
106. Id. at 1000.
107. Id. at 1001; see also Steve Berkowitz, Oliver Luck Brings Own Perspective to
NCAA on O’Bannon Name and Likeness Issue, USA TODAY (Jan. 16, 2015),
[https://perma.cc/Z8R8-ETC8].
108. O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 1008-09.
109. Id. at 1008.
110. O’Bannon v. NCAA, 802 F.3d 1049, 1079 (9th Cir. 2015).
111. Darren Rovell, Dean Smith Remembers Players in Will, ESPN (Mar. 26, 2015),
[https://perma.cc/Q8GJ-3EAP].
112. Chip Patterson, NCAA Responds to Inquiries Regarding Dean Smith’s $200 Gift
to Players, CBSSPORTS.COM (Mar. 28, 2015), [https://perma.cc/7WTQ-YRZA].
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ii. In re NCAA Grant-in-Aid Cap Antitrust Litigation and the
Pay-for-Play Model
While awaiting the O’Bannon decision, in March 2014,
Shawne Alston, a former West Virginia University running back,
filed a class action lawsuit on behalf of current and former
football players in five of the top athletic conferences in the
NCAA.113 Martin Jenkins, a former defensive back for Clemson
University, and three other Division I student-athletes also filed a
class action stating that financial aid awards and potential
compensation should be determined by an open market and not
regulated by the NCAA.114 These cases were consolidated in In
re NCAA Grant-in-Aid Cap Antitrust Litigation,115 to be tried
before Judge Wilken, who also presided over O’Bannon.116
The plaintiffs sought an injunction prohibiting the NCAA
and five of the top athletic conferences from adopting any
limitations on the amount of compensation that may be paid to
student-athletes while in school.117 The complaint argued that the
NCAA cannot limit financial aid to tuition, room and board, and
books, while excluding incidentals.118 The plaintiffs argued that
former athletes should be awarded damages for incidentals like
travel and other costs associated with being student-athletes.119
The complaint also alleged that there is an inequality
between the grant-in-aid cap and the actual cost of attendance,
resulting in student-athletes receiving less each year than they
would in a competitive market.120 The complaint stated that
denying players the benefits of economic assistance has imposed
significant hardships on these athletes as their lives are much
different from the average student.121 Student-athletes (1) “have
113. See Complaint, supra note 73, at 1, 5, 11.
114. See Jenkins Complaint, supra note 74, at 5-7, 35, 39-40.
115. In re NCAA Grant-in-Aid Cap Antitrust Litig., 24 F. Supp. 3d 1366-68 (J.P.M.L.
2014).
116. Id. at 1367-68; O’Bannon v. NCAA, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955, 955 (N.D. Cal. 2014).
117. Consolidated Amended Complaint, supra note 75, at 1, 4.
118. Id. at 1 (accusing the NCAA and its members of unlawfully agreeing to set the
grant-in-aid value that schools pay their athletes to not compensate for the full cost of
attendance).
119. Id. at 4.
120. Id. at 1-2, 4.
121. Id. at 2, 6.
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much less time and ability to earn money through part-time jobs
than do other students;” (2) “are more likely to come from lowincome households;” and (3) “are more likely to incur substantial
travel costs to attend school.”122 Judge Wilken issued an
injunction that barred the NCAA from limiting student athletes’
compensation for anything that would contribute to their studies,
such as computers, postgraduate scholarships, tutoring, study
abroad expenses, or paid internships.123 However, her injunction
stopped short of allowing compensation not related to
education.124
In May 2020, the Ninth Circuit ruled that the NCAA
violated the Sherman Antitrust Act when the NCAA limited
schools from offering certain education-related benefits to
student-athletes, and affirmed Judge Wilken’s injunction.125 The
United States Supreme Court is set to hear arguments in the 2021
Spring Term, and will issue a decision before the term ends in
June.126 This will be the first time in more than thirty-five years
that the Supreme Court has addressed compensation of NCAA
student-athletes.127
iii. Name, Image, and Likeness Statutes
In September 2019, California passed the first legislation of
its kind to allow collegiate student-athletes to profit from their
names, images, and likenesses.128 Soon thereafter, Florida,
Illinois, and New York introduced bills similar to California’s.129
By the end of 2020, five states had passed name, image, and

122. Consolidated Amended Complaint, supra note 75, at 6.
123. In re NCAA Grant-in-Aid Cap Antitrust Litig., 375 F. Supp. 3d 1058, 1072, 110910 (N.D. Cal. 2019).
124. Id. at 1109-10.
125. In re NCAA Grant-in-Aid Cap Antitrust Litig., 958 F.3d 1239, 1265 (9th Cir.
2020).
126. NCAA v. Alston, No. 20-512, 2020 WL 7366281 (U.S. Dec. 16, 2020).
127. Ngoc Pham Hulbig & Joel Mitnick, Supreme Court to Weigh in College Sports:
The Intersection of Antitrust and “Amateurism,” JDSUPRA (Dec. 21, 2020),
[https://perma.cc/S8UY-AVKE]
128. S.B 206, 2019 Leg. (Ca. 2019).
129. H.B. 251, 2020 Leg. (Fl. 2020); H.B. 3904, 101st Gen. Assemb. (Ill. 2020); S.B.
6722, 2019 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2019).
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likeness statutes,130 and thirty-five states had pending name,
image, and likeness legislation.131
Each state’s bill has its own nuances and creates a complex
weave of legislation that the NCAA, institutions, and studentathletes would have to navigate. While the California bill
addresses rights and restrictions of postsecondary institutions,
athletic associations (e.g. the NCAA), and student-athletes, it
generally provides that student-athletes may receive
compensation for their names, images, and likenesses.132 The bill
also allows student-athletes to be represented by agents, but does
not limit that representation to name, image, and likeness
agreements so long as the agent is registered with the State of
California.133 The legislation does require a student-athletes to
disclose any agreement for his or her name, image, and likeness
to his or her institution, and the institution has the ability to bar
the student-athlete’s deal if it conflicts with the school’s
sponsorship agreements.134
The California bill also restricts postsecondary institutions
and athletic associations from enacting or enforcing any rule that
restricts a student-athlete’s ability to earn compensation for his or
her name, image, and likeness.135 Postsecondary institutions and
athletic associations also cannot compensate student-athletes for
their names, images, and likenesses.136
Postsecondary
institutions are prohibited from altering a student-athlete’s
scholarship eligibility for receiving compensation from name,
image, and likeness, and athletic associations may not bar a

130. California (CAL. EDUC. CODE § 67456 (West 2020)), Colorado (COLO. REV.
STAT. § 23-16-301 (2020)), Florida (FLA. STAT. § 1006.74 (2020)), Nebraska (NEB. REV.
STAT. § 48-3603 (2020)), and New Jersey (N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:3B-87 (West 2020)).
131. Name, Image, Likeness (NIL) Rights Legislation Tracker, VELA | WOOD,
[https://perma.cc/T8VP-AV5A] (Nov. 10, 2020) (Alabama, Arizona, Connecticut, Georgia,
Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan,
Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, New York, North
Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South
Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, and
Wisconsin).
132. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 67456.
133. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 67456.
134. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 67456.
135. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 67456.
136. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 67456.
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student-athlete from participating in sports based on receiving
compensation for his or her name, image and likeness.137
Colorado’s bill includes many similar provisions as
California’s bill, such as allowing student-athletes to receive
compensation for their names, images, and likenesses, and hire
agents to represent them.138 The bill also explicitly prohibits
schools from compensating its student-athletes and allows
schools to bar a student-athlete from signing a deal that would
conflict with the school’s agreements.139
Likewise, Nebraska’s bill (1) permits student-athletes to be
compensated for the use of their names, images, and likenesses,
(2) permits student-athletes to hire representatives, and (3)
prevents student-athletes from being required to surrender these
rights.140 Any agreement for representation of a student-athlete
must specify the amount and method of calculating consideration
paid for such services and the names of individuals compensated
under the terms of the agreement, and must include a description
of expenses reimbursed by the student-athlete, a description of the
services provided to the student-athlete, the duration of the
agreement, and the date of execution.141
Like the other bills, Florida’s bill grants student-athletes the
ability to use their names, images, and likenesses for
compensation.142 Any compensation must be commensurate with
the market value of the authorized use and cannot be based on
athletic performance or attendance at a particular institution.143
The compensation must also be provided by a third-party that is
unaffiliated with the student-athlete’s institution; the institution
may not compensate or cause compensation to be directed at a
current or prospective athlete; and the institution may not adopt
any regulation that unduly restricts or prevents compensation for
the athlete’s name, image, and likeness.144

137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.

CAL. EDUC. CODE § 67456.
COLO. REV. STAT. § 23-16-301 (2020).
COLO. REV. STAT. § 23-16-301.
NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 48-3603 to -3604 (2020).
NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-2610 (2020).
FLA. STAT. § 1006.74 (2020).
FLA. STAT. § 1006.74.
FLA. STAT. § 1006.74.
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Florida is also requiring its institutions to provide financial
literacy and life skills workshop training for a minimum of five
hours at the beginning of the student-athlete’s first and third
academic years.145 This training must include training on
financial aid, debt management, and budgeting.146 Most notably,
though, Florida’s bill will be effective on July 1, 2021—the
earliest of all the states’ bills.147
With the hodgepodge of state statutes, the NCAA is again
forced to scramble to find a response before Florida’s bill
becomes effective. A state-by-state approach to name, image, and
likeness legislation would render the NCAA’s legislation
impossible to apply, and could create a competitive disadvantage
for institutions in states without name, image, and likeness
bills.148 The NCAA has lobbied for federal legislation to preempt
all the variations of state legislation,149 but, like the states’
legislation initiatives, multiple variations of federal legislation
have been proposed.150
The first federal proposal came from Representative Mark
Walker of North Carolina.151 His bill, the “Student-Athlete
Equity Act,” conditions the NCAA’s tax-exempt status on
permitting or not substantially restricting a student-athlete’s
ability to receive compensation for his or her name, image, or
likeness.152 Senator Marco Rubio proposed the second piece of
federal legislation—the “Fairness in Collegiate Athletics Act.”153
Senator Rubio’s bill would allow student-athletes to profit from
their names, images, and likenesses.154 However, the bill
provides the NCAA significant ability to limit what opportunities
145. FLA. STAT. § 1006.74.
146. FLA. STAT. § 1006.74.
147. FLA. STAT. § 1006.74.
148. Justin Sievert, The Name, Image, and Likeness Legal and NCAA Regulatory
Landscape, VELA | WOOD: VW BLOG, [https://perma.cc/5QLA-PQLU] (last visited Jan. 29,
2021).
149. Andy Staples & Nicole Auerbach, Which Bill to Compensate College Athletes
Will Win Out, and Which One Should?, ATHLETIC (Dec. 28, 2020), [https://perma.cc/2RTMDSSL].
150. See id.
151. Sievert, supra note 148.
152. Student-Athlete Equity Act, H.R. 1804, 116th Cong. (2019).
153. Sievert, supra note 148.
154. Fairness in Collegiate Athletics Act, S. 4004, 116th Cong. (2020).
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would be available to student-athletes, including the ability to
enact rules and programs needed to preserve the amateur status of
student-athletes, ensure appropriate recruitment, and prevent
deals with third parties offered to recruit or retain a student-athlete
at a particular institution.155
Representative Anthony Gonzalez introduced the “Student
Athlete Level Playing Field Act” in September 2020.156 His bill
explicitly preempts the states’ legislation, restricts agreements
with certain industries (i.e., involving tobacco or vaping, alcohol,
controlled substances, adult entertainment, or gambling),
prevents athletes from using the logo of a third-party at any event
sponsored by their institution, and revises the Sports Agency
Responsibility and Trust Act to prevent institutional boosters
from providing or offering to provide compensation to induce an
athlete to attend a particular institution.157 The bill would allow
student-athletes to endorse products that conflict with their
institution and would permit representation if the athlete notifies
the institution of the relationship.158
A unique feature to the Student Athlete Level Playing Field
Act is that it grants enforcement oversight to the Federal Trade
Commission (“FTC”).159 The bill charges the FTC with bringing
unfair or deceptive trade practice claims should violations of the
bill occur.160 Additionally, the bill creates a “Covered Athletic
Organization Commission,” which would comprise of thirteen
members tasked with recommending potential legislative
changes, regulating agents, and providing a resolution process for
disputes between athletes and their institutions.161
Senator Cory Booker of New Jersey also proposed a bill that
has been dubbed a “Bill of Rights” for student-athletes.162 His
bill does not explicitly preempt the state statutes, but it does
include an avenue for student-athletes to participate in group

155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.

Id.
Staples & Auerbach, supra note 149.
Student Athlete Level Playing Field Act, H.R. 8382, 116th Cong. (2020).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Staples & Auerbach, supra note 149.
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licensing and revenue sharing.163 Senator Roger Wicker of
Mississippi introduced his own bill in December 2020.164 His bill
requires student-athletes to pass at least twelve percent of that
student-athlete’s credits toward graduation before he or she can
pursue name, image, and likeness opportunities.165
III. NCAA’S NAME, IMAGE, AND LIKENESS
SOLUTION
In October 2020, in response to many of the state’s
legislative proposals, the NCAA Division I Council published its
proposed changes to the NCAA Bylaws in response to name,
image, and likeness.166 Under the new rules, student-athletes
would be able to use their names, images, and likenesses to
promote camps and clinics, private lessons, their own products
and services, and commercial products and services.167 Studentathletes may also receive compensation for their autographs and
personal appearances.168 Student-athletes may “crowdfund for
nonprofits or charitable organizations, catastrophic events and
family hardships, as well as for educational expenses not covered
by cost of attendance.”169
Under the new rules, student-athletes will now be able “to
use professional advice and marketing assistance regarding name,
image and likeness activities” and to consult “professional
representation in contract negotiations related to name, image and
likeness.”170
The NCAA Division I Council’s proposal explicitly
“[p]rohibit[s] schools from being involved in the development,
operation or promotion of a student-athlete’s business

163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. DI Council Introduces Name, Image and Likeness Concepts into Legislative
Cycle, NCAA (Oct. 14, 2020), [https://perma.cc/3KSX-GLRK] [hereinafter DI Council].
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id.
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activity.”171 The prohibition includes “arranging or securing
endorsement opportunities for student-athletes.”172
Student-athletes are prohibited from using their school’s
logos in advertisements, endorsements, personal appearances, or
promotions.173 Additionally, student-athletes are prohibited from
“activities involving a commercial product or service that
conflicts with NCAA legislation (such as sports wagering or
banned substances).”174 Schools may also prohibit additional
“activities that conflict with school values or existing sponsorship
arrangements.”175
The Division I Council tabled its proposed rules at the 2021
NCAA Convention in January 2021.176 However, the NCAA’s
new legislation will be subordinate to any state or federal
legislation.177
IV. FOLLOWING O’BANNON’S LEAD TO BENEFIT
THE MODERN AMATEUR STUDENT-ATHLETE
Opinions on the best model and proposed legislation for
compensating student-athletes based on name, image, and
likeness vary greatly.178 All of the state and federal statutes and
the NCAA allow student-athletes to profit from their individual
name, image, and likeness.179 However, student-athletes should
be able to negotiate and sign group licensing agreements—the
same type of agreements that have created vast wealth for their
institutions.
By adopting the trust fund model accepted by the Northern
District of California in the O’Bannon opinion, the NCAA can
meet the eight requirements outlined by its Board of Governors
and still allow student-athletes to engage in group licensing
171. DI Council, supra note 166.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Hosick, supra note 30.
177. See Staples & Auerbach, supra note 149.
178. See generally What Do Athletic Directors Think About Name, Image and
Likeness?, ADU, [https://perma.cc/ZU4K-52G8] (last visited Jan. 25, 2021).
179. Staples & Auerbach, supra note 149.
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agreements.180 Even though the Ninth Circuit ultimately
determined that the creation of a trust was an erroneous
remedy,181 the NCAA should still adopt a trust fund system
through its bylaws to permit student-athletes to negotiate group
licensing deals.
Trust funds can take many forms and are highly adaptable to
certain situations.182 A trust fund is a legal entity used to hold
assets for a party, and those assets are managed by a third-party
trustee.183 Trusts are governed by agreements that stipulate under
what circumstances and how frequently trustees may distribute
the trust’s assets.184 By implementing a trust system, studentathletes would have control to monetize their names, images, and
likenesses as a group, but the NCAA could retain a substantial
level of control over how and when student-athletes are
compensated in order to ensure its mission of amateurism is
met.185
Under this system, a student-athletes would still be able to
monetize his or her name, image, and likeness on an individual
level as proposed by all the state statutes, federal legislation, and
updated NCAA Bylaws. However, a trust fund would be created
by a designated entity for group licensing agreements.186 This
trust fund would house a portion of the revenue derived from
institutions’ apparel and media rights agreements as well as other
group licensing deals like video games or trading cards.187 Funds
would be held in trust until the specific student-athlete exhausted
his or her eligibility and graduated from his or her institution, and

180. See NCAA, supra note 28.
181. O’Bannon v. NCAA, 802 F.3d 1049, 1079 (9th Cir. 2015).
182. See Danielle Klimashousky, What Is a Trust Fund?, SMARTASSET (July 18, 2019),
[https://perma.cc/HWP5-PXSK].
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Jonathan Strom, Putting Our Trust in the National Collegiate Athletic Association
(NCAA): How Creating Trusts for Student-Athletes Can Save the NCAA from Itself, 6 EST.
PLAN. & CMTY. PROP. L.J. 423, 438 (2014).
186. See id. at 438; Leslie E. Wong, Our Blood, Our Sweat, Their Profit: Ed O’Bannon
Takes on the NCAA for Infringing on the Former Student-Athlete’s Right of Publicity, 42
TEX. TECH L. REV. 1069, 1103-04 (2010).
187. Wong, supra note 186, at 1103; Strom, supra note 185, at 438.
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at that time, the student-athlete would be entitled to his or her
portion of the funds in trust.188
However, student-athletes could access these funds for
necessaries, such as food, housing, and incidentals related to
competition.189 Permitting student-athletes to access their trusts
only for necessary expenses prior to graduation would allow them
to pay for incidentals that may not be covered by tuition and the
full cost-of-attendance stipend.190 Additional restrictions could
be placed on disbursements for necessaries that incentivize
satisfactory academic progress.191 This model would also benefit
all student-athletes in revenue and non-revenue sports192
equally.193
In fact, this trust concept is not new to amateur athletics. The
IOC already implemented a similar trust system for athletes
during the Olympic Games.194 Under the IOC’s trust model,
athletes may receive distributions from the trust during
competition only for necessary expenses, such as food and
incidentals related to competition.195 After the Games, however,
the athlete may withdraw all the funds remaining in the trust.196
This model also meets the constraints outlined by the
NCAA’s Board of Governors. First, the Board of Governors aims
to “[a]ssure student-athletes are treated similarly to non-athlete
students unless a compelling reason exists to differentiate.”197
The trust fund model allows student-athletes to earn
188. Under O’Bannon, student-athletes could only access funds held in trust after
graduation or if they otherwise left school. See O’Bannon v. NCAA, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955, 982
(N.D. Cal. 2014). This proposal falls within student-athletes that otherwise leave school.
189. Wong, supra note 186, at 1105; Strom, supra note 185, at 438.
190. MITTEN ET AL., supra note 78, at 109; Division II Partial-Scholarship Model,
supra note 78.
191. Strom, supra note 185, at 442.
192. Revenue sports are those that generate revenue, and non-revenue sports do not
generate revenue. Because each school’s fanbase and market is different, each school’s
revenue and non-revenue sports can differ. Generally, football and men’s basketball are
considered revenue sports at the majority of schools. See Steve Berkowitz et al., NCAA’s
Power 5 Schools See Steep Raise in Pay for Non-Revenue Coaches, USA TODAY (Aug. 13,
2019), [https://perma.cc/KMF9-6Y55].
193. Wong, supra note 186, at 1105.
194. Id. at 1104-05.
195. Id. at 1105.
196. Id.
197. NCAA, supra note 28.
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compensation for their names, images, and likenesses exactly like
non-student athletes.198 The trust fund merely allows studentathletes to earn compensation as a group.199 However, it provides
additional safeguards that protect both the student-athlete and the
NCAA’s amateurism and educational mission.200
Next, the Board of Governors seeks to “[m]aintain the
priorities of education and the collegiate experience to provide
opportunities for student-athlete success.”201 To this end, the trust
fund model meets the Board of Governors’ second objective
because it restricts a student-athlete’s ability to receive funds
from group-licensing agreements until he or she successfully
completes his or her degree.202
To ensure the Board of Governors’ third objective of
transparent, focused, and enforceable guidelines and to “facilitate
fair and balanced competition,”203 agreements dictating precisely
when and how trustees can disburse funds creates a transparent
and enforceable method of governing the trusts.204
The Board of Governors’ fourth and fifth objectives aim to
“[m]ake clear the distinction between collegiate and professional
opportunities” and “[m]ake clear that compensation for athletics
performance or participation is impermissible.”205 With a trust
fund system, a clear distinction remains in place because studentathletes will only have limited access to funds for necessities prior
to their eligibility exhaustion or graduation.206 This clear line
maintains the traditions of amateurism but allows student-athletes
to rightfully secure finances for the future. Additionally, because
each trust is derived from the use of a student-athlete’s name,
image, and likeness, and not for the student-athlete’s competitive
performances, the NCAA’s insistence against pay-for-play
remains intact.207
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.

See id.; see also O’Bannon v. NCAA, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955, 1008 (N.D. Cal. 2014).
See O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 1008.
See id.
NCAA, supra note 28.
See O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 982.
NCAA, supra note 28.
See O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 1008.
NCAA, supra note 28.
See O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 1008.
See id. at 983.
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The Board of Governors aims to “[r]eaffirm that studentathletes are students first and not employees of the university.”208
The trust model also creates an unequivocal delineation that
student-athletes are only beneficiaries of the trusts and not
employees of the school. Under this model, the school is never
compensating a student-athlete; all funds in the trust are from
rights holders of the student-athletes’ names, images, and
likenesses.209
The Board of Governors seventh objective is to
“[e]nhance principles of diversity, inclusion and gender
equity.”210 Moreover, by applying the trust fund model to all
student-athletes and sports equally, the NCAA’s objectives of
inclusion and gender equity are met because each student-athlete
shares in the successes of the athletic department as a whole.211
The Board of Governors’ final objective is to “[p]rotect the
recruiting environment and prohibit inducements to select, remain
at, or transfer to a specific institution.”212 By implementing a trust
system, current recruiting restrictions remain in place, and the
existing framework for monitoring recruiting is not disrupted.
The financial gap between the haves and have-nots in
college athletics is growing and shows no signs of slowing
down.213 This proposal does not pretend to reduce the economic
gap between the Power Five conferences and the Group of Five
conferences; it only proposes rewarding the student-athletes for
their contributions to this $16 billion industry.214 Furthermore,
this proposal acknowledges, but does not fully address, other
issues presented by trust funds administered by schools, such as
Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972,215 tax
implications, or the Sherman Anti-Trust Act.216

208. NCAA, supra note 28.
209. See O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 1005.
210. NCAA, supra note 28.
211. See O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 983.
212. NCAA, supra note 28.
213. Associated Press, Getting By with Less: Gap Grows Between FBS Have, Have
Nots, USA TODAY (Dec. 19, 2017), [https://perma.cc/RQ3N-3F7N].
214. Barrett, supra note 79.
215. 45 C.F.R. § 86.41(a) (1975).
216. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-38.
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V. DE LA HAYE UNDER THE MODERN MODEL
Had the NCAA adopted this two-prong model while De La
Haye still played at UCF, he—and thousands of other studentathletes—would have enjoyed the fruits of their labors on and off
the field. De La Haye could have immediately capitalized on his
more than 486 million views on YouTube.217 He also would not
have been forced to forego his athletic career and could have
potentially participated in UCF’s magical undefeated 2017 season
that
culminated
with
a
self-proclaimed
National
Championship.218 Additionally, De La Haye would have had the
opportunity to remain at UCF and finish his marketing degree
which would have given him access to the second-prong of the
model—the trust fund—with an untold amount of additional
funds. Instead, the NCAA chose to banish De La Haye from
collegiate athletics.219
VI. CONCLUSION
The NCAA has taken incremental steps throughout its
history to grant additional rights to student-athletes. Allowing
student-athletes to profit from their names, images, and likenesses
is a step in the right direction but falls short of allowing studentathletes to fully benefit from their contributions to amateur
athletics. Much like O’Bannon and In re NCAA Grant-in-Aid
Cap Antitrust Litigation did not spell the end of amateurism, it is
unlikely that fully preserving student-athletes’ right to license
their names, images, and likenesses will thwart the NCAA’s
amateurism model. However, the recent public pressure and
legislation forced the NCAA to act on a problem it has set aside
for decades. For an organization that has historically resisted
change and pushed for antiquated systems of amateurism, the

217. De La Haye’s current YouTube channels have more than 486 million views
combined. See Deestroying, supra note 3; KD Family, supra note 3.
218. Jordan McPherson, Is Florida Home to the College Football Champs? One
School Thinks So — and Others Agree, MIA. HERALD (Jan. 4, 2018),
[https://perma.cc/XH4T-UNV3].
219. Henneke & Riches, supra note 2.

144

ARKANSAS LAW REVIEW

Vol. 74:1

NCAA has a chance to establish a dynamic system that benefits
student-athletes and college athletics for decades to come.

